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This paper examines the determinants of profitability using operations strategy, productivity, and 
service measures in the context of the U.S. domestic airline industry. Data on ten carriers was 
collected on a quarterly basis between 1995 and 2007. An analysis is performed separately on 
data prior and post 9/11 attack. It is found that operations strategy and productivity measures are 
significant both before and after the 9/11 attack, whereas service measures are only significant 
before 9/11. Some managerial implications are provided. Additionally, it is found that the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
A large body of literature has been devoted in recent years to explore the determinants of 
profitability of firms operating in the service sector (e.g., Schefczyk, 1993, and Dresner et al. 
1995). A commonly analyzed service provider is the airline industry, which offers access to a 
wealth of data. Much of the literature has frequently considered a limited subset of measure types, 
often focusing primarily on productivity measures as drivers of profitability. Naturally, 
profitability is not exclusively determined by operations measures, and a multitude of other 
measures also play a major role in airlines’ profitability, such as service quality and operations 
strategy. In this study, we consider operations strategy, productivity and service measures in 
assessing the profitability of the U.S. airline industry before and after the tragic incident of 9/11.  
In this research, we develop a rich contextual empirical model to understand the 
determinants of the profitability of U.S. domestic airlines, wherein we segment the contributing 
measures to several distinctive categories and we contrast their performance prior and after 9/11. 
The combined impact of both types of measures (operational performance and service quality) on 
profitability in airline industry has only been studied, to the best of our knowledge, by Tsikriktsis 
(2007), which is the closest contribution to our paper. In his empirical analysis, Tsikrktsis has 
considered several operational measures, two service indicators (late arrivals and lost baggage), 
and has categorized airlines into focused and non-focused groups. 1  The latter point is of 
significance and relevance to our study. While Tsikrktsis has focused the attention on a single 
corporate strategy decision—whether to be a focused airline or not—herein we extend the 
corporate decisions beyond the focus level decision. Namely, rather than limiting the strategic set 
of decisions to whether to be a focused or a non-focused airline2, we incorporate additional 
strategic decisions, such as the average flight distance and the average number of seats per plane. 
In fact, we not only extend the spread of strategic operational decisions taken by the firm, we also 
enrich other measuring categories: operational and service measures, in our study, also account 
for ticket oversales and number of consumer complaints per 100,000 enplanements3
This paper reviews relevant studies from both airline and non-airline streams of literature, 
and utilize insights from these studies to develop a set of hypotheses to be tested. After forming 
, respectively.  
                                                          
1 While focused airlines limit their service to a restricted geographical area or to certain types of passengers, 
non-focused airlines offer the lot. 
2 In our analysis we refer to non-focused airlines as Full-Service Carriers (FSC) while focused airlines are 
limited to Low-Cost-Carriers (LCC). We elaborate on the airline types in Section 2.1. 
3 The issue of colinearity of complaints with respects to the other two service measures is handled in 
Dresner and Xu (1995). 
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our hypotheses, we provide implications and relevance for operations strategy, productivity, and 
service quality measures used in this study. We then describe the time series data collected to test 
the hypotheses. By adopting Parks’ method, we conduct a cross-section time series analysis using 
three combinations of the different variable categories with respect to the airline operational 
profitability. The empirical results validate our hypotheses that all three categories of measures 
are significant in explaining profitability prior to 9/11. Namely, strategic decisions (types of 
airlines and average flight distance), productivity measures (loading factor and aircraft utilization), 
and service quality (number of consumer complaints) are significant in predicting profitability. 
Moreover, strategic decisions and productivity measures contribute roughly the same level of 
explanatory power to profitability, whereas service measures contribute the least.  
The 9/11 incident has faced the airline industry with a serious issue as demand fell sharply 
and intensified security measures were introduced. Profitability of airlines declined. To further 
understand the impact of 9/11 we modify our hypotheses to post 9/11 environment and we 
contrast the behavior of industry before and after the incident. The analysis on post 9/11 data 
reveals resemblance to the results with data prior to the attack, with respect to strategy and 
productivity. However, service measures exhibit a different behavior—while prior to the 9/11 
incidence service plays a major role in airlines’ profitability; past 9/11 this appears not to be the 
case anymore. We argue that in the presence of intensified security measures, consumers may be 
referring lack of service or service failures to security incidences rather to the lack of airlines’ 
performance and possibly increased popularity of Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) may lead consumers 
to accept lower levels of service.  
Our research differs from previous studies in several ways. First, our study examines 
operations strategy, productivity and service measures when evaluating profitability. Second, it is 
different from the study by Roth and Jackson (1995) as they examined the service quality 
performance model using perceptual measures; instead, we use objective data. Third, we consider 
a new service variable, consumer complaints, and two additional operations strategy measures, 
stage length and seat density, in our model. Fourth, to the best of our knowledge in airline 
operations management research that none of the existent airline research has considered the 
structural breakdown, such as effect of 9/11, on evaluating profitability in U.S. domestic airline 
industry while we study the impact of 9/11 on profitability. Lastly, our study also explains 
contemporary financial performance using operational variables. 
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This study contributes to the operations management and strategy literature in several 
ways: (i) it examines the relationship between operations strategy, productivity, service and 
profitability; (ii) it considers more customer service quality and productivity measures than those 
used by, e.g. Tsikriktsis; (iii) it assesses the contribution of the different categories of measures in 
terms of explanatory power to profitability; (iv) and it extends the data analysis to post 9/11 
attack and analyze the impact of the attack on profitability as well as the recovery of the different 
types of airlines thereafter. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
the relevant literatures in operations management and hypothesis development. Section 3 
develops the framework for different operations variables and the methodology of data collection. 
Section 4 describes our model estimation and empirical results discussion prior to 9/11 while 
Section 5 presents the findings post to 9/11. Section 6 concludes our findings, contributions, 




Chapter 2 Literature Review & Hypotheses Development 
2.1 The U.S. Airline Industry  
Significant changes have occurred in the U.S. domestic airline industry since the industry was 
deregulated in 1978. This deregulation has eliminated the U.S. government control over fares.  
Competition has intensified as new routes were added by various service providers and new 
carriers entered the market, all of which has resulted with severe losses to major carriers. Most 
dramatically was the emergence of carriers who have focused on offering low-cost service. 
Consequently, the industry’s competitive priorities have changed significantly and major air 
carriers discarded old operating models, which were based on competing mainly on flights 
frequency (Treacy and Wiersema 1995). 
The U.S. domestic airlines are typically classified into four different types: Full-Service 
Carriers (FSC), Low-Cost Carriers (LCC), Regional Carriers (RC) and Charter Carriers (CC). 
FSCs use hub-and-spoke flight structure, which has a full coverage of many city-pairs, through 
the optimization of connectivity in the hub. FSCs operate both U.S. domestic and international 
markets with mostly medium-, and long-haul flights from and to their hub airports. Often, these 
airlines form alliances with partner carriers to enlarge their service network and use vertical 
product differentiation to capture various market segments. Furthermore, they adopt customer 
relationship management, which is known as frequent flyers program to retain most frequent 
players. The “Big Six” U.S. domestic airlines, also known as FSCs, are American, Continental, 
Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways. 
LCCs are those airlines that generally operate aircraft in short-, and medium-haul 
scheduled passenger service between smaller communities and larger hub airports. Their flights 
network structure is usually point-to-point, which is developed from one or few airports, called 
‘bases’, and the destinations are normally limited to within U.S. They attempt to keep their costs 
low by offering a “no-frills” service which implies very limited product differentiation, as well as 
no meal service, no advanced seat selection (for faster boarding), no airport lounges. They often 
offer only one class of seating: coach. In most of cases, their fleet is limited to a single type of 
airplane (such as the Boeing 737), as to keep training and maintenance costs down. The typical 
U.S. domestic LCCs include, American West, Southwest Airlines, and Alaska4
                                                          
4 Alaska can be classified in various ways. Essentially, it appears to be operating according to an LCC 
mode, focused on the Pacific coast, with limited long-haul (Coast-to-Coast) service. 
. Overall, LCCs 
have a simple operating model around non-stop air travel to and from high-density markets. 
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Franke (2004) pointed out the success factors of LCCs’ point-to-point network configuration and 
their streamlined production process in relation to FSCs. By contrast, the FSC model is cost-
penalized by the synchronized hub operations that implicitly accept the extra-time needed for 
passengers and baggage to make connections. Furthermore, the FSC business model relies upon 
sophisticated information systems and infrastructure to optimize its hubs (Cento 2009).  
RCs are the airlines that generally operate aircraft in short-haul scheduled passenger 
service between smaller communities and larger hub airports, which has a similar definition to the 
LCCs mentioned above. However, the aircrafts of RCs are usually of lesser capacity (fewer than 
sixty seats) for U.S. domestic routes and they often fly under a code sharing agreement with FSCs 
to deliver passengers to major hubs from surrounding communities. One example of an RC is 
SkyWest, based in St. George, Utah, which has a code sharing agreement with Delta Airlines, and 
markets itself as “The Delta Connection”. Some RCs are subsidiaries of FSCs, for example, 
Wings West is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Airlines based in San Luis Obispo, 
California and markets itself as “American Eagle”. Truitt and Haynes (1994) indicated that the 
regional carrier industry has demonstrated the economic advantages of serving smaller markets 
with smaller, more fuel-efficient, aircrafts. 
A CC is usually defined as an airline company that operates flights outside normal 
schedules by a specific hiring arrange with a particular group of customer. Most of charter flights 
are to transport holidaymakers to tourist destination, and the tickets are mostly sold by tour 
operator companies who have chartered the flight. In general, charter flights are sold as part of a 
holiday package in which the prices includes flights, and other accommodations. The flights by 
CCs are normally operated on the basis of near 100% seat occupancy, and the standard of seating 
and service are sometimes lower than on schedule airlines. Mason et al. (2000) identified the 
sources of cost advantages of UK charter airlines: higher loading factors and aircraft utilization as 
well as lower distribution costs and aircraft leasing costs with respect to the two largest LCCs in 
Europe, easyJet and Ryanair. Tradewind Aviation is an example of U.S. CC operating between 
New York and New Jersey. 
Within the context of this study, we focus primarily on two airline types, FSC and LCC.  
However, we also group American Eagle Airline, which was formerly defined as a RC, under 
LCC, since the airline had recently expanded its service to medium-haul schedule routes and its 
fleet capacity in most of the routes had exceeded the traditionally RC capacity of sixty seats. Thus, 
we have six FSCs (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways) and four 
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LCCs (Alaska, American West, American Eagle and Southwest Airlines) in our analysis.5
In the remaining of this section, we elaborate on the various determinants of airlines’ 
profitability. We group these determinants into three primary categories: operations strategy, 
productivity, and service. These categories have been studied by the literature to different degrees, 
as we elaborate below. 
 In the 
following sections, we briefly review studies that examined the impact of operations strategy, 
productivity and service quality, on profitability in airline industry and develop our theory and 
hypothesis. Each section begins with general overview of literatures review in service and 
manufacturing organizations, followed by specific studies in airline industry. 
2.2 The Impact of Operations Strategy on Profitability  
Over the past decade or two, there has been an abundance of research on the area examining the 
impact of operations strategy on profitability. Boyer et al. (2002) provide an examination of three 
different operations strategies available to e-services providers in order to expand offerings and 
streamline services while illustrating these approaches with a case study of Sothebys.com. Boyer 
et al. (2004) conclude that, even in the context of advanced manufacturing, manufacturing plants 
make operations strategy trade-off between cost, delivery, flexibility and quality. Overall, 
Boyer’s (2004) finding constructs a strong link between operations strategies and profitability in 
manufacturing industry.  
Within the airline sector, Lapre and Scudder (2004) conducted an empirical study on 10 
major U.S. airlines to validate the Sand Cone model developed by Ferdows and De Meyer (1990). 
In summary, the Sand Cone model indicate that in order to reduce costs effectively, firms needs 
to first improve quality, then reliability and speed. The creation of value requires quality 
improvements to be made prior to the hunt for speed, reliability or cost reductions. The empirical 
results from this study reveal that airlines that have focused on the operations strategy of service 
quality ended up with superior quality-cost position than the initial position. Airlines that operate 
further away from the asset frontier 6
                                                          
5 Alternatively, this classification could be viewed similarly to Tsikriktsis’, wherein full-service airlines are 
categorized separately than focused airlines (LCCs and RCs). 
 operation are able to improve cost and quality 
simultaneously. For instance, Alaska Airlines, which operated far from its asset frontier, was able 
to reduce operating cost without impairing quality by reducing turn-around time and adding seats 
to the aircrafts without reducing legroom (by adjusting closets and galleys). On the other hand, 
6 Asset frontier is formed by structural choices made by a company-investment in plant and equipment.  
This term is first introduced from “Theory of Performance Frontiers” by Schemener and Swink (1998). 
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airlines that operates close to the asset frontier operation need to consider the initial trade-off of 
improving quality at the expense of cost before reaching a better quality-cost position. The 
literature by Cannon, Randall and Terwiesch (2007) that has linked operations strategies 
measures to profitability is written with respect to revenue forecasting application, or predicting 
future earnings. That is, the relative performance with respect to the airlines and the overall 
pattern of the measures play a more relevant role in the analysis of profitability than simply the 
absolute levels. 
Belobaba (2009) indicate that the average cost per available seat mile (CASM) of FSCs is 
50% higher than that of LCCs, overwhelming the revenue management advantage of FSCs.  He 
also point out that the average flight distance and size of aircraft represent specific operations 
strategy to particular airlines. Baltagi, Griffin and Rich (1995) attribute the operating cost savings 
to the deregulation in 1986. They note that the deregulation had pronounced effects on route 
structure, as unit cost per mile reductions from increased stage length more than rising average 
operating costs from expanding points served. Baltagi et al.’s also show that while larger aircrafts 
provide more seating capacity they could, in fact, be more expensive to operate and are more 
expensive to acquire than smaller ones. According to Borenstein (1989), the hub-and-spoke flight 
structure allows more efficient use of aircrafts and other inputs than point-to-point flight system. 
Furthermore, the dominance of airports by single carriers appears to result in higher fares for 
passengers who fly to or from these airports. Borenstein also indicate that long-haul flights 
exhibit economies of scale resulting in lower per-passenger costs. In addition, Tsikriktsis (2007) 
divide the U.S. domestic airlines into two groups: focused and non-focused, where the latter 
group consists only of FSCs. In his analysis, Southwest, America West and Alaska airlines were 
categorized as focused airlines. The two groups have their distinct operations strategy, and 
different dimensions of operations performance drive different profitability. Tsikriktsis’ empirical 
analysis suggests that the focused airlines’ business model outperformed full-service airlines in 
terms of profitability between 1988 and 1998. In line with the empirical findings from Baltagi et 
al. (1995), Borenstein (1989) and Tsikrktsis (2007), we state the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1:  Operations strategy measures significantly affect profitability. 
2.3 The Impact of Productivity on Profitability  
Several literatures study the relationship between productivity and profitability in manufacturing 
and service operations. Hammesfahr et al. (1993) indicate that production capacity decisions have 
direct impact on firms’ competitive positions and profitability. They also pointed out that 
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improving productivity is most efficient when the production process is operated at full capacity. 
If the improved production systems are operating at any level less than full capacity, then often 
they increased production costs. Banker et al. (1993) study the impact of productivity, price 
recovery, product mix and capacity utilization on firms’ profitability in U.S. telecommunications 
industry—an industry which has also gone through a deregulation process. They conclude that 
productivity is highly associated with changes in overall profitability, and had shown an 
increasing trend on airline productivity after the deregulation. Smith and Reece (1999) study the 
relationship between productivity and business performance through a field-based research 
against a wholesale distribution service setting. They test a conceptual model of business 
performance using productivity measures as mediating variable between the independent 
variables of business strategy and the dependent variable of business performance. The empirical 
results show that productivity variables are strongly correlated with financial performance of 
businesses.  
Heskett et al. (1997) study service profit chain 7
                                                          
7  Service profit chain establishes relationships between profitability, customer loyalty and employee 
satisfaction, loyalty and productivity. The links in the chain are as follow: Profit and operations growth are 
driven by customer loyalty, which is a direct result of customer satisfaction. Satisfaction is influenced by 
the value of services provided to customers. Value is created by loyal, satisfied and productivity employees. 
In turn, high employee satisfaction results high quality of services to customers. 
, which established the links for 
productivity and financial performance measure. An important finding from this study is that high 
employees’ satisfaction leads to higher productivity and quality of service. This ultimately results 
in superior financial performance. The service profit chain from Heskett et al. (1997) is also 
related to “the resource-based model of sustained competitive advantage” which is discussed 
extensively in Barney (1991, 1995). The model of service profit chain suggests that the sources of 
sustained competitive advantage were firm resources which were valuable, rare, imperfectly 
imitable, and non-substitutable. Anderson et al. (1997) study the relationship between 
productivity, customer satisfaction, and profitability between different goods and services in 
Sweden. The findings indicate that both productivity and customer satisfaction are positively 
correlated with profitability for goods and services, yet the interaction between the two is positive 
for goods, but significantly negative for services. Hence, increasing both customer satisfaction 
and productivity simultaneously is likely to be more challenging in service industries. D’Aveni 
(1989) defines three types of operational resources: financial, managerial and internal resource 
munificence. Financial resources reflect the unused borrowing capacity of a firm; managerial 
resources are used to capture the top manager’s status of their educational and professional 
affiliations; internal resource munificence is defined as an interaction variable that combines the 
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effect of both financial and managerial resources. D’Aveni further indicates that effective 
utilization of firms’ resources increase both productivity and profitability simultaneously and 
save firms from bankruptcy.  
Few literatures specifically examine the impact of productivity on profitability in the 
airline industry. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), Schefczyk (1993) studied the impact of 
productivity on financial performance in the international airline industry. He validated that 
productivity was positively correlated with the return on equity and further illustrated that 
productivity measures were one of the important factors in predicting overall performance. Oum 
et al. (2005) measured and compared the performance of 10 major North American airlines in 
terms of productivity, cost competitiveness and average yields. Their major finding is that 
productivity improvements result in greater operational profits. They also indicated that airlines 
needed to perform well in both productivity and pricing strategy to be financially successful. 
Tsikriktsis (2007) studied the impact of productivity and service quality measures on profitability 
using time-series regression analysis. One important finding from this paper is that productivity 
measures—loading factors and aircrafts’ capacity utilization—are statistically significant and 
with positive coefficients in predicting profitability, with different magnitudes for FSCs and 
focused airlines. Based on findings from Banker et al. (1993), Schefzyk (1993), Oum et al. (2005), 
and Tsikriktsis (2007), we state the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2:  Higher productivity leads to higher profitability.   
2.4 The Impact of Service on Profitability  
Studies concerned with the impact of service on profitability are common within the marketing 
literature. Empirical results from the database of Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies (PIMS) 
established a link between customer satisfaction and economic return in service industry (Buzzell 
and Gale 1987). This has triggered research on the relationships between customer satisfaction, 
market share, and profitability. Reicheld and Sasser (1990) suggested that higher customer 
satisfaction created greater profit through rising revenues, reduced costs to acquire customers, 
lower customer-price sensitivity, and decreased costs to serve customers familiar with a firm’s 
service delivery system. Fornell (1992) indicated that the costs of attracting new customers were 
lower for firms that have already achieved a high level of customer satisfaction, and that satisfied 
customers were willing to buy goods and services more frequently. Similarly, Ittner and Larcker 
(1998) claimed that service quality influenced purchase behavior, and that it could significantly 
reduce the costs of customer retention and acquisition. Anderson et al. (1994) developed a model 
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that transformed customer experience from the service and former expectation towards the 
service into a customer satisfaction measure. They concluded that firms with high customer 
satisfaction benefited from superior economic returns in long-run, but customer satisfaction fell 
as market share increased. Heskett et al. (1997) indicated poor service quality led to 
dissatisfaction among customers, hence, yielded a negative impact on profit.  
Several studies focused on the interaction between service and profitability particularly in 
banking industry. Garvin (1988) found that high customer satisfaction reduced price elasticity for 
existing customers. In other words, satisfied customers were more likely to tolerate price 
increases.  This, ultimately, result in higher profit margins. Hallowell (1996) showed that in order 
to make up for a poor banking service; it took more than six excellent services to retain customers 
for repurchasing the service. Loveman (1998) examined the impact of employee and customer 
satisfaction on financial performance. His results showed significant positive relationship 
between customer satisfaction and financial performance, which was less significant than the 
relationship between employee satisfaction and financial performance. Rust et al. (1995) 
presented the “return on quality” approach that quantified the benefits in improving service 
quality in terms of financial measure. The findings suggested that quality was an investment, but 
it was also possible to spend too much effort on quality improvement resulting in a waste of 
resources. Voss et al. (2005) focused on the customer satisfaction and profitability relationships 
in private sector organizations and they concluded that managerial choice had a stronger impact 
than quality on both service quality and customer satisfaction. 
Few literatures have studied the impact of airline service quality on financial performance. 
Dresner et al. (1995) examined the relationship between three customer service measures (On 
time performance, ticket oversales and mishandle baggage) and consumer complaints and, in turn, 
on profitability of U.S. airlines. The results strongly supported that increasing customer service 
raised customer satisfaction, which led to improved financial performance. Particularly, 
improving performance on one customer service measure, mishandled baggage, was found to 
increase airline carrier profitability. The model also demonstrated how customer service can 
affect corporate performance directly through the mediating variable, customer satisfaction. 
Tsikriktsis (2007) has indicated that focused airlines were performing better in terms of 
profitability than full-service airlines because of their operations strategy on service quality. The 
empirical results showed that one service measure, late arrivals, had impact on profitability. 
Based on the above studies, we state the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3:  Higher customer service leads to higher profitability. 
2.5 On Operations Strategy, Productivity, and Service 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, separately state the relationship between each category of measures 
(Operations Strategy, Productivity, and Service) and firms’ financial performance. Combining all 
three categories, we argue that operations strategy, as a category, provides the greatest 
explanatory power in predicting profitability of firms, in general, and airlines, in particular. 
Operations strategy decisions, as the name imply, reflect long-term strategic decisions made by 
the firm’s decision makers.  Since so, we expect operation strategy to exhibit the most important 
link to profitability. Among the remaining two categories, productivity and service, we suspect 
productivity to shed more light on profitability than service. We believe that some, and 
potentially even most, of the passengers may self-select themselves into airlines which provide 
certain levels of service. Namely, passengers may still choose to fly on a carrier offering lower 
fares even if they expect lower levels of service, and also even they happen to experience service 
failures. Hence, service measures may take longer to affect airlines’ profitability. On the other 
hand, productivity measures are directly linked to airlines’ immediate financial performance. For 
example, increasing utilization of aircrafts implies more flights, and, consequently, greater profit. 
To summarize, we state the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4:  Operations strategy measures contribute greater explanatory power to 
profitability than productivity measures, which, in turn, provide greater explanatory power than 
service measures. 
In sections 3 and 4 we outline the data collection and conduct the hypotheses testing. 
However, the analysis is performed on pre-9/11 data, the effect of which has not been considered 
so far in the paper. We separately elaborate on the potential effects of 9/11 in section 5, wherein 
we update the hypotheses to fit the post-9/11 reality. Corresponding analysis is conducted therein. 
2.6 Effect of 9/11 on the Airline Industry 
From the mid 1990s to the beginning of the millennium, the profitability of U.S. aviation industry 
was relatively stable. However, this did not last long. In the beginning of 2000, the economic 
slowdown caused fluctuations, and the September 11 attack in 2001 presented the industry with a 
major disruption. KLM’s CEO, Leo Van Wijk, made the following statement after the terrorist 
attack (Wijk 2001): 
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 …many passengers are cancelling their reservations and we can 
expect diminishing loading factors as a result. Demand is diminishing 
on various international routes and I do not expect this to change in 
near future…  
(www.klm.com) 
 
Following the terrorist attack on September 11th, the U.S. airline industry announced a 
total of 100,000 layoffs and employment in October and November fell by almost 8%. The U.S. 
airline sector had lost around 20% of its relative value measured in last quarter of 2001 since 
September 10. Consequently, many FSCs were forced to make changes to their business structure 
and operations strategy as well as other cost cutting measures. Two major air carriers (US 
Airways and United Airlines) have declared bankruptcy, while Delta, Northwest and American 
Airlines have experienced tremendous financial pressure. US Airways and United announced 
code-share agreements, and a similar contract was developed by Continental, Northwest, and 
Delta. Southwest Airlines had taken an equity stake in the financially troubled low cost carrier 
ATA. Finally, US Airways and American West had recently proposed a merger. 
Figure 3 below exhibits the profitability of airlines (broken into the two types of carriers, 
FSCs and LCCs) before and after 9/11. It is evident the prior to the incident the overall 
performance of the industry, in terms of profitability, was reasonable, and it was fluctuating 
between about 4%-15%. Indeed, shortly before the attack profitability was heading down, but 
there is no argue that in the quarters ensuing 9/11 profitability was catastrophic. Overall, 




Figure 1: Profitability in the U.S. domestic Airline Industry  
A limited number of studies have examined the impact of September 11th attack on the 
airline industry. Hatty and Hollmeier (2003) presented a European view of the global airline crisis 
in 2001/2002. They discussed the change in operations strategy at Lufthansa German Airlines 
following the terrorist attacks. Due to the drop of air traffic demand, Lufthansa airline rapidly 
reduced its flight frequencies on long-haul flights, which helped to stabilize yield and corporate 
results. Alderighi and Cento (2004) also provided analysis of European carriers after September 
11. Their decision making are as a mixture of short- and long-term goals, where the weights 
depended on firm-specific adjustment costs and financial situation. They further defined flexible 
and non-flexible carriers. Flexible carriers presented high responsiveness to both short- and long-
term profitability and they were driven by short-term goals. On the other hand, non-flexible 
carriers presented low reaction to short- and long-term profitability and they were typically driven 
by long-term goals. Based on the findings from these papers, we would like to understand 
whether if our former hypotheses still hold after the incident of 9/11.  
In the absence of reason to assume otherwise, we propose that the effect of operations 
strategy and productivity on profitability is as argued earlier. Specifically, we state: 


















Hypothesis 2a: After 9/11, higher productivity leads to higher profitability. 
However, we suspect that after 9/11, service may present a completely different pattern. 
Namely, after 9/11, security measures have been altered immensely. Subsequently, procedures 
and process took different shape, and normally, it came on the expense on consumer service. That 
is, as security checking were intensified, passengers have experienced, e.g., prolonged waiting. 
As service has deteriorated, it may be reasonable to assume that various forms of delays could not 
be traced by passengers to their real source.8
Hypothesis 3a: After 9/11, higher customer service does not lead to higher profitability. 
 As passengers expect to encounter lower service 
levels, they may also be more forgivable to other airlines’ service failures, and often associate 
lack of service to intensified security measures. Consequently, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Since service measures do not expect to affect profitability significantly, we set the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4a: After 9/11, operations strategy measures contribute the greatest explanatory 
power to the model than productivity measures, which, in turn, provide greater explanatory 
power than service measures. 
  
                                                          
8 Of an exception is probably the infamous case of JetBlue, whose operations has completely given way on 
Valentine’s Day in 2007 
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Chapter 3 Sample  
To test our hypotheses, we use U.S. domestic airline industry data from the first quarter of 1995 
to the fourth quarter of 2007. This choice of time framework is in order to study the impact of 
profitability before September 11st attack. We note that the airline industry is forced, through 
regulation, to disclose detailed operational data to public. Productivity and operations strategies 
data are retrieved from Air Carrier Financial Reports and Air Carrier Summary Data, a 
publication issued quarterly, while service quality measures can be collected from Air Travel 
Consumer Report. These reports are all issued by the Department of Transportation (DOT). The 
U.S. airlines studied in this research include Alaska, United, Northwest, US Airways, Delta, 
American, Continental, Southwest, and American West. In summary, six FSCs (American, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, US Airways, and United) and four LCCs (Alaska, American West, 
and Southwest) are studied.  
3.1 Measures  
The dependent variable is a percentagewise measure of operating profit over operating revenue 
(OPOR), calculated for each airline on a quarterly basis. This measure only considers the 
financial report from transporting passengers, excluding cargo shipping. Similar to Tsikriktsis 
(2007), we choose this measure as our dependent variable over other profitability measures (such 
as net profits, or return on investment), because it is not confused by differences in accounting 
measures concerning owning versus leasing airplanes, interest on loans, etc.. Such a 
percentagewise measure is not subject to variations due to differences in accounting procedures 
and the effect of size is also removed. Given that our dependent variable is a percentage rather 
than an actual amount, the term profitability in the remaining of the paper refers to the relative 
profitability.   
3.1.1 Operations Strategy Measures 
We use the following five operations strategy measures: LCC, FSC*Time, LCC*Time, Stage 
Length, and Seat Density. We have a dummy that account for differences between FSCs, and 
LCCs. The dummy variable, LCC, takes a value of 1 when the airline is an LCC and a value of 0 
otherwise (i.e., an FSC).  The differences between these two airline types we covered earlier in 
section 2.1. Additionally, as we expect FSCs and LCCs to behave and react differently over time 
to market changes, we also consider the interaction variables FSC*time, and LCC*time. That is, 
we separate the time factor for the two types of airlines – these are used to control for the time 
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trend of FSC and LCC profits over the study period and also account for any strategy and policy 
changes over time, which are not captured by the other operations measures. Another variables, 
stage length, accounts for the average distance flown in statute miles per aircraft departure and is 
calculated by dividing total aircraft miles flown by the number of total aircraft departures 
performed each quarter. The last operations strategy variable is seat density, which measures the 
average seating configuration of an airline’s operating fleet and is derived by dividing total 
available domestic seat miles flown by the number of aircraft miles flown. Generally, FSCs 
operate large capacity aircrafts. Belobaba (2009) illustrated that a large airline, like a FSC, is 
expected to see some economies of scale (reduction in unit costs with increased output) as its 
fixed costs are spread over a larger output of ASM. That is, FSCs should have lower unit costs 
than LCCs. In overall, the operations strategy measures are designated to differentiate carriers 
based on their operations structure, Hub-and-Spoke for FSCs and Point-to-point for LCCs, for 
instance, the seating capacity of the fleet and the stage length of any given flight of LCCs are 
relatively smaller and shorter than FSCs. 
3.1.2 Productivity Measures  
Airline productivity measures are used to evaluate the firms’ usage efficiency. We have selected 
three productivity measures which reflect three levels of productivity within the operations of 
airlines: space usage of the plane, time usage of the planes, and employees’ productivity. We 
target these three factors by accounting for the loading factor, aircraft utilization, and available 
seat mile per employee, respectively. Loading factor is referred to capacity utilization for 
passengers and it can be determined by revenue passenger miles divided by available seat miles. 
Revenue passenger miles is a measure of passenger for an airline flight and it is calculated by 
taking the summation of the products of revenue aircraft miles flown on each inter-airport hop 
multiplied by the number of revenue passengers carried on that hop. It is sometimes referred to as 
Revenue Per Kilometer, RPK. Aircraft utilization is the percentage of total block hours that 
aircrafts are operated by specific airline in the air, discarding on-ground services. Available seat 
mile per employee (ASME) is the available seat mile produced by each employee in the firm and 
it is calculated using total available seat mile from domestic routes over total number of 
employees. Available seat mile is a common airline output measure that is calculated using the 
domestic air miles flown in each inter-airport hop multiplied by the total number of seats 
available on that hop for revenue passenger use and available seat mile is often referred to as 
Available Seat Kilometers, ASK. Note, that all productivity measures in this study consider 
passengers related aspects only, and do not account for cargo. 
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3.1.3 Service Measures 
We consider four service variables in this study: on-time flight, mishandled baggage, ticket 
oversales, and consumer complaints. On-time flight is the overall percentage of airline on-time 
performance. A flight is counted as “on-time” if it did not arrive the airport less than 15 minutes 
after schedule time shown in the carriers’ Computerized Reservation Systems and all the 
cancelled and diverted flights are also counted as delay. This measure is calculated and reported 
as a monthly average for each airline by DOT. As the other operations and productivity measures 
in this study are all on quarterly basis, we convert this service measure into quarterly data as well. 
Mishandled baggage counts the lost, damaged, delayed or pilfered baggage based on mishandled 
baggage reports per 1000 passengers every month for each airline. As the number of mishandled 
baggage is also reported on a monthly basis, for the same reason as previous service measure, we 
also convert it into quarterly data. Tickets oversales are the total number of passengers denied 
boarding per 10,000 enplanements every quarter and it also consists of both voluntary and 
involuntary categories of overbooking. Voluntary overbooking is defined as passengers 
voluntarily gave up their seat on an oversold flight in exchange for compensation while 
involuntary overbooking refers to passengers, who are involuntarily bumped off the aircraft due 
to oversold. Consumer Complaints is a measures number of complaints files by consumers per 
100,000 passengers. Originally, the data can be broken down into the categories of complaints 
(flight problem, baggage, reservation, boarding, customer service, refunds, disability, frequent 
flyer program, fares, discrimination and advertising), but we maintain the measure on the 
aggregated basis. Since Consumer Complaints may include the prior service measures defined in 
the paper, we verify that the measures are not correlated, through a correlation test is conducted to 





Chapter 4 Pre 9/11 Analysis 
4.1 Model Estimation 
Figure 1 shows the overall relationship of the different measures considered above to profitability 
in the U.S. domestic airline industry. The unit of analysis of this study is a carrier’s domestic 
operating unit. In order to test our hypotheses, we examine the impact of operations strategy, 
productivity and service on profitability using Parks’ method, given in Model 1. We develop two 




Our time-series data may exhibit the following effects: autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, 
and contemporaneous correlation. Autocorrelation is to be expected in the model because of the 
nature of time-series data. Heteroscedasticity is also expected because observations for airlines 
operating at different scales could potentially result in different variance. Contemporaneous 
correlation between airline companies may be expected because of potential relationships 
between firms. For that end, we use a time-series method developed by Parks (1967) to analyze 
the data. In addition, Parks method has been used in studies analyzing time-series airline data 
(Tsikriktsis, 2007 and Heineke, 2004). Hence, similar to Tsikriktsis (2007), we also use the time-
series cross section regression (TSCSREG) procedure in SAS (SAS/ETS 1993) for the analysis.  
An important advantage of Parks method is that it considers the first-order autoregressive with 
Productivity 
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Figure 2: Relating Strategy, Productivity and Service to Profitability Ratio (inspired by Tsikriktsis 2007) 
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contemporaneous correlation between cross sections in which the random errors 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 =
1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇, have the following structure, where N represents the total number of 
airlines studied and T represents total time period analyzed. 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (First-order autocorrelation), 
𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ) = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (Heteroscedasticity), 
𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  (Contemporaneously correlated), 
The following model is used for testing our hypothesis.  
Model 1: 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽6 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽8 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽9 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽11 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       
This model provides important insights when testing our hypothesis. We examine the p-value of 
coefficient for each variable at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level to conclude whether the variable is 
significant. The model also generates the overall fitness, R2, and the correlation matrix among 
different variables.  
To further understand whether the type of airline (FSCs vs. LCCs) interacts with the productivity 





𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽6 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽8 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽10 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽12 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽14 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽16 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽18 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽19 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽20 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽21 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       
4.2 Estimation and discussion 
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1 in the Appendix. It is evident that prior to 9/11, 
LCCs have a higher average of OPOR than FSCs. The average stage length of LCCs is shorter 
than FSCs, which is fairly intuitive as elaborated earlier due to the different network 
configurations (point-to-point vs. hub-and-spoke). LCCs also have a lower aircraft seat density 
comparing to FSCs. That is, LCCs usually operate smaller aircrafts than FSCs. In general, the two 
types of airlines have similar loading factors levels. Yet, LCCs have slightly higher aircraft 
utilization and the amount of ASME generated per employee than FSCs. Considering service 
quality, LCCs have lower proportions of mishandled baggage claims and consumer complains 
while FSCs exhibit a greater percentage of on-time flight performance. 
The estimation of Models 1 and 1A are provided in Table 2 in the Appendix. These 
models explain at least 47.8 percent of the variations in profitability. The empirical results 
provide some interesting insight with regards to the impact of the independent variables on 
profitability.  
Operations strategy measures. The intercepts of both models are negative and highly 
significant, while the dummy variable LCC is not significant; indicating the types of airlines 
entered the timeframe of the analysis making loses. From Model 1 we also observe that FSCs’ 
losses were deepening over time (notice the significant and negative interaction term FSC*Time). 
Recall that we have identified these two types of airlines, FSCs and LCCs, as employing 
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completely distinct operating models: hub-and-spoke and point-to-point, respectively. As such, it 
is important to identify the role of supporting operation strategy measures. In that respect, we find 
that stage length is significant and negative in Model 1 for both FSCs and LCCs. This may imply 
that serving longer haul destinations does not lead to the expected revenues and/or cost savings. 
Belobaba (2009) argue that an airline’s operating costs are positively correlated with the size of 
its network and fleet, the average seat capacity of its aircraft and its average stage length. The 
operating costs are naturally greater for longer stage lengths as more fuel is consumed and more 
labors hours are required. In fact, long-haul flights are usually operated by senior pilots that have 
higher wage rates than the pilots for short-haul flights. Quite surprisingly, seat density has no 
predictive power in both models. Note that this is despite its low correlation with stage length. 
Overall, we find several operations strategy measures with significant explanatory power, which 
leads us to conclude that Hypothesis 1 has been validated. Moreover, note in Table 4, that when 
we account only for operations strategy variables, we obtain an R2 of 0.29.  
Productivity measures. In Model 1, both productivity measures, loading factor and 
aircraft utilization, show strong significance at the 0.01 level, while in Model 1A, wherein the 
productivity measures are segmented into their interaction term with FSCs and LCCs separately, 
in which case we find that loading factor has a greater coefficient for FSCs than for LCCs in 
terms of profitability. The descriptive statistics indicate that LCC has a higher average of aircraft 
utilization than FSC. This can be attributed to the different network models, schedule of flights 
and the efficiency in turning an aircraft on the ground between one arrival and next departure. 
The longer turnaround times will reduce the block hours per day for each aircraft. Gittell (2003) 
pointed out that Southwest Airlines, first LCC in U.S. airline, has made turnaround time with an 
average of 20 to 30 minutes, while the most network airlines have their turnaround time 
approximately 1.5 to 2 hours at a connecting hub. This is due to the fact that they would like to 
ensure the flight connections for passengers and their baggage. Large seat capacity aircrafts 
usually takes longer boarding time as well as the time for aircraft cleaning prior to boarding. 
Belobaba (2009) identifies two factors for airlines to improve their aircraft utilization. He 
suggests increasing the number of flight departures per day by reducing the turnaround time 
and/or by increasing the operation flights at off-peak departure times. Also, he recommends 
increasing the number of seats on each aircraft without switching to larger size of aircraft by 
replacing first or business class seats with more economy-class seats and/or by reducing the 




Overall, we have support for Hypothesis 2, as we find that productivity measures to 
contribute significantly to the model. 
Service measures. Surprisingly, none of the service measures, on-time flight delay, 
mishandled baggage and ticket oversales, are significant in our model, except for consumer 
complaints, which is strongly significant with the estimate of -0.01471. This still supports our 
Hypothesis 3 that service measure is significant to profitability. Table 3 in the Appendix 
summarizes the correlation matrix of all measures in Table 1 and the results have sown that there 
is no significant correlation between the number of consumer complaints and the rest of service 
measures. A summary of R-squares using different groups of measures is presented in Table 4 in 
Appendix. Productivity measures appeared to have a slightly higher explanatory power on 
profitability than operations strategy while the service measures serve the least explanatory power. 
Consequently, our Hypothesis 4 is partial supported with that both operations strategy and 
productivity measures contribute the same level of explanatory power on profitability.   
From service measures, we consider our findings for consumer complaints. The results 
indicate that consumer complaints have negative impact on profitability for both types of airlines 
and we use the “zone of tolerance” argument by Parasuraman et al. (1990) to explain this finding. 
The argument states that the zone of tolerance is tighter for the service quality dimension which is 
most critical to firms’ financial success. In our studies, passengers experience is the major 
competitive strength in airline industry, which has a narrow zone of tolerance for unsatisfactory 
services that is then transformed to consumer complaints and is reflected on airlines profitability. 
Figure 3 shows that LCC consistently has relatively lower number of consumer complaints than 
FSC until 2000. More unsatisfactory services are observed on LCC and hence, in Figure 1, gap of 
profitability between LCC and FSC has narrowed, which indicates that LCC has been financially 
penalized. As the LCC slowly improved their service quality near the end of 2000, a new gap of 
profitability is once observed between LCC and FSC. This implies that LCC has been excellent 















































Chapter 5 Post 9/11Analysis 
In order to examine the impact of September 11 on airlines’ profitability, we extend our data 
collection to include all the measures up to the fourth quarter of 2007. The FSC studied post 9/11 
remain the same as the prior 9/11 studies, but one of the LCCs, American West Airline, is 
replaced by American Eagle Airline due to too many missing data. In overall, six FSCs 
(American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, US Airways, and United) and three LCCs (Alaska, 
American Eagle, and Southwest) are studied post the attack.  
5.1 The Effect of 9/11 on Airline Industry Revisited 
To further verify that the drop in the profitability sustains even after controlling for all other 
factors, we perform the analysis below. Initially, we employ a fixed-effect time series model to 
verify the presence of an enduring post 9/11 effect. That is, before ensuing with the analysis, we 
want to make sure that the observed differences in profitability prior and post 9/11, can be related 
to time factors only, and not to other changes in the previously mentioned measures. Using a 
fixed-effect model9
Model 2: 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= (𝛼𝛼 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽7 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽8 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽10 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
, which had two-way effects, cross-sectional firm and time-series effect with 
the independent error structure 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇,  and identically distributed 
random variable with zero mean and 𝜎𝜎𝑜𝑜2 of variance, where N is the number of cross sections and 
T was the length of the time series for each cross section. We concluded our model was 
dependent on both cross-section and time-series effects with a series of F-tests. The two-way 
fixed-effect model is presented below. 
                                                          
9 The panel data has several missing entries, and, thus, the random effect model cannot be adopted. 
25 
 
The parameter 𝛼𝛼, represents the intercept of the model, while 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  are non-random 
parameters for cross-sectional and time-series, respectively, to be estimated. Same operations 
strategy, productivity and service measures from previous Parks’ method are also used in this 
model. The regression results for two-way fixed-effect model provided in Table in the Appendix.  
Figure 4 depicts the trend of the time coefficients, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 , from the model between second 
quarter of 1995 and last quarter of 2007. It is evident that the coefficients are relatively stable 
until the fourth quarter of 2000; a significant decreasing trend is observed in the third quarter of 
2001, which is the same quarter during which September 11 took place. A major drop in the time 
coefficients observed after the incident is approximately 0.25. The airlines managed to slightly 
recover from the attack starting in the first quarter of 2001, and it can be observed that this trend 
peaked in the fourth quarter of 2003. Overall, the averages of coefficients before and after 
September 11 were 0.228 and 0.042, which concludes the impact of 9/11 on the U.S. airline 
industry. 
 
Figure 4: Time-Series Coefficients from Two-Way Fixed-Effects 
By using the two-way fixed-effects model (Model 2), we had studied the impact of 9/11 

















operations strategy, FSC and LCC, by comparing OR employing two commonly used indicators: 
RPM and ASM. The plots in Figure 5 are the total ASM and RPM (i.e., combined for both FSCs 
and LCCs) between 2000 and 2004. The market has reached the similar level of ASM and RPM 
as before 9/11 in third quarter of 2002. Figure 6 plots the ASM and RPM broken into FSCs and 
LCCs. It is evident that both FSCs and LCCs have suffered from the attack in terms of ASM and 
RPM. However, it seems that FSCs have experienced a greater loss of both RPM and ASM than 
LCCs. The decline of ASM and RPM for FSC was approximately 14%, whereas the magnitude 
for LCCs is about 8%. Interestingly, ASM and RPM for LCCs appear to be trending upwards in 
post 9/11 data, while FSCs’ ASM has stabilized and FSCs’ RPM resonates that of LCCs.  
 

















Figure 6: FSCs’ and LCCs’ ASM and RPM 
5.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics post 9/11 attack is summarized in Table 6 in the Appendix. It is evident that 
the average of profitability for both FSCs and LCCs has decreased significantly after 9/11 to -
7.09 and 4.39 respectively. Interestingly, FSCs appear to expand their stage length and increase 
the aircraft seat density post the attack, while LCCs have shortened their flight distance per trip 
and operate with smaller aircrafts than before. One noticeable improvement on productivity 
measure for FSCs is that the loading factor has increased from 70 to 77%. Regarding airline 
service quality after the attack, LCCs show a great improvement in all service measures, except 
for mishandled baggage. The on-time flight performance has increased from 74.76 up to 77.33% 
and the number of consumer complaints has dropped from 1.46 to 0.55 per 100,000 passengers. 
Similarly, the number of ticket oversales has dropped from 22.91 to 11.92 per 10,000 
enplanement. At the same time, the corresponding service measures for FSCs have remained the 
same. 
Post 9/11 attack, the model using Parks’ method (MODEL 1) explains 74% of the 
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FSCs with a significant loss of profit, which can be explained by the former discussion on 
reduced RPM and ASM for FSCs after 9/11. However, an increasing trend of profitability for 
FSCs is observed, whereas LCCs experience a decreasing trend on profitability with a negative 
coefficient of -0.0041. Stage length remains negative impact on profitability; In Model 1A in 
Table 8 in the Appendix, the negative impact of stage length on profitability only exists for FSCs. 
Based on these findings, Hypothesis 1a is supported, i.e., operations strategy measures are still 
significant after 9/11. We find that the productivity measure loading factor has a greater weight in 
the model with a coefficient twice as large as before the attack, while the estimated coefficient of 
aircraft utilization has decreased slightly by 0.04 percentage points. Hence, Hypothesis 2a is also 
supported.  
None of service measures is significant after 9/11, which also indirectly Hypothesis 3a 
that passengers are more forgiven to service glitches and associated lack of service to security 
measures. Table 9 in the Appendix shows no significant correlation between the number of 
consumer complaints and the rest of service measures. The R-squares with different groups of 
measures post 9/11 are summarized in Table 10 in the Appendix. Operations strategy measures 
have the greatest explanatory power on profitability than productivity while the service measures 
still serve the least explanatory power. In general, the good of fit of the models have improved 
significant. Consequently, our Hypothesis 4a is supported.  
Our empirical results also have some implications for managers post 9/11 attack. We see 
that 1% increase in the coefficient of loading factor would result in 1.32 percentage points’ 
increase in OPOR; whereas 1% increases in aircraft utilization would increase OPOR by 0.31%. 
Given that the mean of OPOR is -3.26% with a deviation of 12.25%, one could appreciate the 
magnitude of potential benefits for airlines. The impact of loading factor for FSCs is even more 
significant. The results have shown that 1% increase in loading factor for FSCs results in 1.70 
percentage point increase in OPOR. Given that the mean of OPOR for FSC is -7.09 % with a 
standard deviation of 11.26%, this magnitude of benefit would actually mean almost 23.9% 
increase in their profitability. Similarly, 1% increase in loading factor for LCC results in 0.86% 
point increase in OPOR, which is approximately 19.6% of improvement in profitability. Figure 7, 
both types of airlines have shown their improvement on loading factor since 9/11 attack. The 
average difference at any given point of time between FSC and LCC is approximately 5 
percentage points, which is almost identical to the difference of OPOR improvement on loading 
factor. Overall, managerial implications of our findings suggest that FSCs and LCCs might be 
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better off by improving their loading factors and aircraft utilizations immediately, which, in turn, 
increases their profitability. 
 

























Chapter 6 Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we examine the relationship between operations strategy, productivity, and service 
measures on profitability in U.S. domestic airline industry. We find that prior to 9/11 attack, all 
three types of measures are significant in explaining profitability. FSC is found with a declining 
trend on profits over time. A negative impact on profitability is observed when increasing stage 
length. Loading factor and aircraft utilization both show strong impact, in terms of significant and 
large coefficients, on profitability. Specially, the coefficient of loading factor of FSCs is almost 
double the coefficient of the loading factor of LCCs. Consumer complaints is the only service 
measure that shows significance in our model. Post 9/11 attack, it appears that FSCs are slowly 
improving their profits, whereas LCCs have a slightly decreasing trend with profitability over 
time. Increase in stage length continues to show negative impact on profitability especially for 
FSCs. Moreover, loading factor is found to have an even greater significance and impact on 
profitability than before 9/11, whereas the significance for aircraft utilization has slightly 
decreased. 
Overall, we find support for Hypotheses 1 (operations measures are significant on airline 
profitability), 2 and 3 (higher productivity and service quality lead to greater profitability). 
However, we have only found partial support for our Hypothesis 4 (operations measure contribute 
greatest explanatory power on profitability) that productivity measures also contribute the same 
level of explanatory power as operations measure. Post 9/11 attack, we also find support for 
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a (higher service measure does not lead to greater profitability) and 4a 
(operations measure contribute greatest explanatory power on profitability). 
We also discuss the reasoning behind the fact that LCCs have higher aircraft utilization 
than FSCs using Belobaba’s (2009) argument and findings from Gittel (2003). Moreover, we 
have also found evidence to support the “zone of tolerance” argument by Parasuraman et al. 
(1990) in airline industry that LCCs are penalized for providing low quality services in recent 
years as they were consistently excellent service carriers. Several managerial implications are 
made for airline operations management. Both FSCs and LCCs are recommended to increase 
their loading factors as their top priority to generate higher profits. 
This research study also allows us to make several contributions to the operations 
management literature. We study the impact of operations strategy, productivity, service and 
profitability while using more customer service quality and productivity measures than those used 
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by, e.g. Tsikriktsis (2007). We identified operations strategy measure being the greatest 
explanatory power on profitability. Moreover, we extend our data to post 9/11 attack and analyze 
the impact of the attack on profitability. 
Our study is also subject to few limitations. First, we can only include Alaska, American 
Eagle, American West and Southwest Airlines as LCCs due to insufficient information on other 
LCCs in the U.S. This may create bias and inconsistency in the results for LCCs as we have only 
considered 4 of them. Consequently, more LCCs should be studied in the future studies. Second, 
we have not considered fuel cost in our model, which are also known to have strong impact on 
airline profitability, since different airlines have different contract to supply their fuel needs. 
Third, as the data is in the form of cross-section time series, we use Parks’ method in SAS for 
analysis. However, due to the limitations of the built-in function in Parks’ method, we can only 
use the first-order of autocorrelation in the model. One should test the model up to fourth order of 
autocorrelation (i.e., a lag of one year) using Parks’ method and choose the optimal order of 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables Before 9/11 (27 quarters prior to 9/11) 
  All Airlines Full-Service Airlines Low Cost Carriers  
  (N = 243) (N = 162) (N = 81) Data 
 Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Source 
Profitability Operating Profit / Operating Revenue 
6.59 9.17 5.71 9.42 8.35 8.44 Form 41 (P-52) 
Operations Strategy 
Measure 
Stage Length 755.74 172.02 803.24 156.65 660.75 162.56 Form 41 (T2) 
Seat Density 145.38 13.13 149.74 13.76 136.64 4.95 Form 41 (T2) 
Productivity Measure 
Loading Factor 0.69 0.04 0.70 0.03 0.68 0.04 Form 41 (T2) 
Aircraft Utilization 0.35 0.04 0.33 0.02 0.39 0.04 Form 41 (T2) 
ASM per Employee (in K) 441.07 541.21 422.51 448.60 478.19 521.30 Form 41 (P-10 & P-12) 
Service Measure 
On-time Flight 76.84 16.42 77.88 19.54 74.76 6.38 
Air Travel Consumer 
Report 
Mishandled Baggage 4.99 1.19 5.07 1.07 4.83 1.38 




19.99 5.79 22.91 9.57 




Table 2: Results of Parks Method Before 9/11 
  Model 1 Model 1A 























Stage Length -1.6E-04*** -3.52   
Seat Density 5.21E-04 0.81   
FSC*Stage Length   -1.8E-04 -1.47 
LCC*Stage Length   -1.7E-04 -1.61 
FSC*Stage Density   -3.8E-04 -0.27 
LCC*Seat Density   3.51E-03 0.61 
Productivity 
Measure 
Loading Factor 0.95** 5.66   
Aircraft Utilization 0.35** 2.34   
ASM per Employee 3.29E-07 0   
FSC*Loading Factor   1.08*** 3.05 
LCC*Loading Factor   0.63** 2.04 
FSC*Aircraft Utilization   0.63 1.46 
LCC*Aircraft Utilization   0.242 0.84 
FSC*ASM per Employee   5.92E-07 0 
LCC*ASM per Employee   1.22E-07 0 
Service 
Measure 
On-time Flight 2.91E-04 1.26   
Mishandled Baggage 4.8E-03 0.95   
Ticket Oversales 2.07E-04 0.23   
Consumer Complaints -1.47E-02** -2.09   
FSC*On-time Flight   1.76E-04 0.49 
LCC*On-time Flight   3.96E-03 1.54 
FSC*Mishandled Baggage   1.07E-02 0.81 
LCC*Mishandled Baggage   1.31E-02 1.37 
FSC*Ticket Oversales   1.45E-03 0.70 
LCC*Ticket Oversales   3.8E-05 0.02 
FSC*Consumer Complaints   -1.62E-02 -1.17 
LCC*Consumer Complaints   -1.44E-02 -0.83 
 R2 0.478  0.676  
 Sample Size 243  243  
Notes. Dependent variable: Operating Profit over Operating Revenue (OPOR).  























LCC 1 -0.39*** -0.47*** -0.27*** 0.69*** 0.49*** -0.09 -0.09 0.19*** -0.07 
Stage 
Length  1 0.40*** 0.29*** -0.05*** 0.12* -0.05 0.19*** 0.30*** 0.42*** 
Seat 
Capacity   1 0.19*** -0.18*** 0.23*** 0.05 0.21*** 0.14** 0.11* 
Loading 
Factor    1 -0.11* 0.11* 0.03 -0.12* -0.02 0.30*** 
Aircraft 
Utilization     1 0.45*** -0.05 0.01 0.19*** -0.04 
ASME      1 0.06 -0.02 0.21*** 0.10 
Flight 
Delay       1 -0.17*** -0.16** -0.21*** 
Mishandle 
Baggage        1 -0.02 0.14 
Ticket 
Oversales         1 0.25*** 
Consumer 
Complaints          1 
*Signified significant at 0.10 in a two-tail test, ** at 0.05. *** at 0.01 
 
 
Table 4: R-Square Comparison Before 9/11 



















 0.293 0.32 0.145 0.437 0.443 0.365 0.478 






Table 5: Results of Fixed Two-way Effects Regression Analysis All Periods 
Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
T-stat. Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
T-stat. Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
T-stat. 
Time-Series Effect    Cross Section Firm Effect  
1995Q2 0.26*** 4.85 2001Q4 -0.02 -0.55 Alaska -0.02 -0.87 
1995Q3 0.30*** 6.37 2002Q1 -0.08* -1.67 American Eagle*** 0.32 3.32 
1995Q4 0.29*** 6.25 2002Q2 0.04 0.95 American -0.03 -0.74 
1996Q1 0.26*** 5.14 2002Q3 0.07* 1.95 American West** -0.08 -2.37 
1996Q2 0.25*** 5.01 2002Q4 -3.83E-03 -0.1 Continental -0.03 -0.94 
1996Q3 0.29*** 6.78 2003Q1 0.05 1.15 Delta -0.04 -1.25 
1996Q4 0.22*** 5.39 2003Q2 0.03 0.8 Northwest 0.03 1.62 
1997Q1 0.23*** 4.86 2003Q3 0.09*** 2.63 Southwest** 0.06 2.24 
1997Q2 0.26*** 5.46 2003Q4 0.11*** 3.28 United* -0.07 -1.93 
1997Q3 0.28*** 6.49 2004Q1 0.10*** 2.8    




1998Q1 0.27*** 6 2004Q3 0.05* 1.68 Operations Strategy   




1998Q3 0.27*** 6.73 2005Q1 -0.01 -0.35 Stage Length -7.0E-05 -0.78 
1998Q4 0.23*** 5.82 2005Q2 -0.01 -0.21 Seat Density 1.86E-03** 2.08 
1999Q1 0.25*** 5.66 2005Q3 0.03 0.84 Productivity   
1999Q2 0.26*** 5.77 2005Q4 0.01 0.3 Loading Factor 0.95*** 5.03 
1999Q3 0.28*** 7.13 2006Q1 4.43E-03 0.14 Aircraft Utilization 0.41*** 3.45 
1999Q4 0.24*** 6.19 2006Q2 0.01 0.23 ASM per Employee 1.22E-07 0 
2000Q1 0.23*** 5.55 2006Q3 0.05 1.56 Service Quality   
2000Q2 0.23*** 5.41 2006Q4 0.02 0.73 On-time Flight -4.0E-05 -0.13 
2000Q3 0.24*** 6.29 2007Q1 0.03 0.95 Mishandled Baggage 1.96E-03 0.66 
2000Q4 0.21*** 5.47 2007Q2 0.04 1.26 Ticket Oversales -1.20E-04 -0.17 
2001Q1 0.17*** 4.15 2007Q3 0.05 1.58 Consumer Complaints -6.56E-03 -1.15 
2001Q2 0.17*** 4 2007Q4 0.04 1.06    
2001Q3 0.10*** 2.6       
R2  0.736       
Notes. Dependent variable: Operating Profit over Operating Revenue (OPOR) 
*Signified significant at 0.10 in a two-tail test, ** at 0.05. *** at 0.01 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables After 9/11 (25 quarters post 9/11) 
  All Airlines Full-Service Airlines Low Cost Carriers  
  (N = 243) (N = 162) (N = 81) Data 
 Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Source 
Profitability Operating Profit / Operating Revenue 
-3.26 12.25 -7.09 11.26 4.39 10.49 Form 41 (P-52) 
Operations Strategy 
Measure 
Stage Length 813.74 234.00 918.44 168.76 604.35 204.31 Form 41 (T2) 
Seat Density 137.73 34.19 153.30 10.76 106.57 42.79 Form 41 (T2) 
Productivity Measure 
Loading Factor 0.75 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.70 0.05 Form 41 (T2) 
Aircraft Utilization 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.05 0.35 0.07 Form 41 (T2) 
ASM per Employee (in K) 487.66 124.95 493.53 80,81 475.92 184.12 Form 41 (P-10 & P-12) 
Service Measure 
On-time Flight 77.77 5.01 77.99 4.93 77.33 5.18 
Air Travel Consumer 
Report 
Mishandled Baggage 5.62 2.75 5.12 1.89 6.62 3.76 
Ticket Oversales 14.17 5.16 15.29 5.02 11.92 4.72 




Table 7: Results of Parks' Method After 9/11 
  Model 1 Model 1A 


































Stage Length -2.9E-04*** -5.18   
Seat Density -3.7E-04 -0.53   
FSC*Stage Length   -2.6E-04** -2.05 
LCC*Stage Length   -2.9E-04 -1.16 
FSC*Stage Density   1.2E-03 0.61 
LCC*Seat Density   -2.2E-03 -0.76 
Productivity 
Measure 
Loading Factor 1.32*** 10.35   
Aircraft Utilization 0.31** 2.55   
ASM per Employee 1.36E-07 0   
FSC*Loading Factor   1.70*** 3.39 
LCC*Loading Factor   0.86*** 2.48 
FSC*Aircraft Utilization   0.18 0.54 
LCC*Aircraft Utilization   0.67 0.79 
FSC*ASM per Employee   2.22E-08 0 
LCC*ASM per Employee   4.87E-07 0 
Service 
Measure 
On-time Flight 2.0E-03 1.49   
Mishandled Baggage 3.0E-03 0.88   
Ticket Oversales -3.9E-04 -0.38   
Consumer Complaints -8.7E-03 -0.58   
FSC*On-time Flight   8.9E-04 0.24 
LCC*On-time Flight   8.1E-05 0.02 
FSC*Mishandled Baggage   4.0E-03 0.35 
LCC*Mishandled Baggage   -1.1E-03 -0.10 
FSC*Ticket Oversales   5.3E-04 0.20 
LCC*Ticket Oversales   -2.4E-03 -0.56 
FSC*Consumer Complaints   -5.6E-03 -0.17 
LCC*Consumer Complaints   8.1E-03 0.11 
 R2 0.738  0.787  
 Sample Size 225  243  
Notes. Dependent variable: Operating Profit over Operating Revenue (OPOR).  
























LCC 1 -0.63*** -0.65*** -0.51*** 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 0.26*** -0.31*** -0.55*** 
Stage 
Length  1 0.73*** 0.59*** 0.37*** 0.40*** -0.06 -0.46*** 0.12 0.29*** 
Seat 
Capacity   1 0.44*** 0.52*** 0.65*** 0.13 -0.62*** 0.36*** 0.27*** 
Loading 
Factor    1 0.33*** 0.38*** -0.44*** -0.03 -0.14 0.39*** 
Aircraft 
Utilization     1 0.59*** -0.16** -0.21*** -0.03 0.09 
ASME      1 0.03 -0.37*** -0.01 -0.16** 
Flight 
Delay       1 -0.50*** 0.25*** -0.33*** 
Mishandle 
Baggage        1 -0.40*** 0.22*** 
Ticket 
Oversales         1 0.22*** 
Consumer 
Complaints          1 
*Signified significant at 0.10 in a two-tail test, ** at 0.05. *** at 0.01 
 
Table 9: R-Square Comparison After 9/11 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model A+B Model A+C Model B+C Model A+B+C 
 
Operations 















 0.586 0.560 0.059 0.702 0.599 0.448 0.738 




Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables (52 quarters) 
  All Airlines Full-Service Airlines Low Cost Carriers  
  (N = 468) (N = 312) (N = 156) Data 
 Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Source 
Profitability Operating Profit / Operating Revenue 
0.02 0.19 -0.44 0.12 0.06 0.10 Form 41 (P-52) 
Operations Strategy 
Measure 
Stage Length 783.63 206.01 858.62 172.26 633.64 185.38 Form 41 (T2) 
Seat Density 141.70 25.78 151.45 12.52 122.19 33.37 Form 41 (T2) 
Productivity Measure 
Loading Factor 0.72 0.06 0.73 0.06 0.69 0.05 Form 41 (T2) 
Aircraft Utilization 0.35 0.05 0.34 0.04 0.37 0.06 Form 41 (T2) 
ASM per Employee (in K) 463.47 977.21 456.65 737.15 477.10 132.62 Form 41 (P-10 & P-12) 
Service Measure 
On-time Flight 77.29 12.33 77.93 14.47 76.00 5.96 
Air Travel Consumer 
Report 
Mishandled Baggage 5.29 2.11 5.09 1.52 5.69 2.92 
Ticket Oversales 17.70 7.25 17.73 5.91 17.63 9.39 
Consumer Complaints 1.30 1.13 1.44 0.96 1.02 1.37 
 
 
